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"Institutional Corruption and the Rule of Law"
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 
AND THE RULE OF LAW1
PAUL GOWDER
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
ABSTRACT:
The literature contains two concepts of corruption which are often confused with one
another: corruption as twisted character (pollution), and corruption as disloyalty. It also
contains two sites for corruption: the corruption of individuals, and the corruption of
entire institutions such as a state or a legislature. 
This paper first draws a clear distinction between the pollution and disloyalty concepts of
corruption in the individual context, and then defends a conception of disloyalty corrup-
tion according to which the distinguishing feature is an agent who uses powers delega-
ted to her from her principal as her own. Then, the paper shifts gears to the institutional
context, arguing that the best account of institutional corruption in the extant literature
is of the pollution kind. It then fills the remaining logical space by laying out a conception
of institutional corruption as disloyalty and explaining its moral significance for the poli-
tical legitimacy of a democracy. 
RÉSUMÉ:
La littérature présente deux concepts de la corruption qui sont souvent confondus l’un
avec l’autre : d’abord la corruption en tant que phénomène de distorsion d’un caractère
(pollution) et, ensuite, la corruption en tant que déloyauté. La littérature répertorie éga-
lement deux lieux dans lesquels se déploie la corruption : la corruption des individus et
la corruption d’institutions entières, telles qu’un État ou une législature. 
Cet article établit, dans un premier temps, une distinction claire entre les concepts de cor-
ruption liés à la pollution et la déloyauté dans un contexte individuel. Il défend ensuite une
conception de la corruption par déloyauté selon laquelle la caractéristique distinctive est
un agent qui utilise les pouvoirs qui lui sont délégués par son principal comme étant les
siens. L’article se tourne ensuite vers le contexte institutionnel, en faisant valoir que le
meilleur compte rendu de la corruption institutionnelle dans la littérature existante
concerne la corruption de type pollution. Il comble ensuite l’espace logique restant en
énonçant une conception de la corruption institutionnelle en tant que déloyauté et en
expliquant sa signification morale pour la légitimité politique d’une démocratie. 
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But it has perhaps been wearisome to you, who, before
I said a word, knew all about his venality. However,
he calls it friendship and amity; and only just now he
spoke of “the man who taunts me with the friendship
of Alexander.” I taunt you with the friendship of
Alexander! Where did you get it? How did you earn
it? I am not out of my mind, and I would never call
you the friend either of Philip or Alexander, unless we
are to call a harvester or other hired laborer the friend
of the man who pays him for his job. But it is not so.
How could it be? Far from it! I call you Philip’s hire-
ling of yesterday, and Alexander’s hireling of today,
and so does every man in this Assembly. - 
Demosthenes2
In recent years, Dennis Thompson, Larry Lessig and others have articulated the
concept of “institutional corruption,” characterized, on Lessig’s account, by
improper organizational dependencies. In this paper, I propose to reveal a diffe-
rent face of institutional corruption, and its relevance for democracy and the rule
of law. 
The analysis proceeds through several steps. First, I argue that our existing
concept of corruption in the individual context is actually two concepts. There
is a moralized conception of corruption as transactional disloyalty, which I say
is “moralized” because we ordinarily attribute moral blame to the agent who
engages in actions that are corrupt in this sense; it is pro tanto blameworthy—
it requires some novel argument to make any particular case not blameworthy.
And there is a non-moralized conception of corruption as pollution, tainting by
some external force; it is pro tanto not blameworthy. The disloyalty concept of
corruption is about an agent’s actions, the tainting concept about the influences
on an agent’s character. And the disloyalty and tainting conceptions of indivi-
dual corruption trigger distinct social responses: someone who is corrupt in the
disloyalty sense is punished, someone who is corrupt in the tainting sense is
treated. 
Second, I suggest that the existing scholarly literature contains a compelling
non-moralized conception of institutional corruption, in the form of Lessig’s
“dependence conception,” but does not contain a plausible moralized conception.
I develop one, centering on the idea that an institutionally corrupt state in the
moral sense is one whose institutions de jure or de facto permit public officials
to treat the power of the state as their own. 
Third, I explain the significance of moralized conceptions in the institutional
context. While dependence corruption is a sufficient reason to carry out politi-
cal reforms (the institutional equivalent to individual treatment), the presence
of institutional corruption in the moralized sense suggests deeper failings in a
democratic system: such corruption is inconsistent with popular sovereignty and
the rule of law. A state that contains it to a substantial degree may lose its legi-
timate entitlement to power. 
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INDIVIDUAL CORRUPTION: POLLUTION OR DISLOYALTY?
The literature on the concept of corruption has been distorted (“corrupted,” even)
by an equivocation between two notions that, in ordinary language, come under
the same head. On the one hand is what I will call a tainting, or heteronomy,
conception of corruption. On this conception, the corrupt individual has had his
or her will or character twisted by some external influence; s/he has been pol-
luted.3 On the other is the notion of corrupt conduct, exemplified by bribe-taking,
which is a form of disloyalty. Scholars have recognized these two ideas, but
ordinarily suppose that they are both different faces of one thing;4 here, I shall
suggest that they’re really two things, which can, but need not, be present in the
same person or transaction. 
The tainting sense of corruption is the one at play in Lord Acton’s “power tends
to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Acton isn’t saying, here,
that the one with power sells that power, in the bribe-taking sense of corruption,
to the highest bidder. Indeed, the notion seems superfluous: if you have absolute
power, you don’t need to trade favors for money. You have soldiers to get you
money. Unsurprisingly, the tyrant through history, from the Thirty in Athens
through Hitler, has preferred to expropriate rather than bargain. Rather, Lord
Acton is saying that the soul of the one with power is polluted, warped, by that
power. 
This tainting sense of the notion of corruption dominates book 9 of Plato’s Repu-
blic: the best government devolves into oligarchy in virtue of breeding errors
(!) which allow inferior characters to enter into power. Notice that Plato’s story
moves from the individual corruption of the souls of those who take office to the
institutional corruption of the state under their rule—a causal sequence that is
typical of Republic’s famous state-soul analogy, but is not unique to Plato. Simi-
lar accounts of the pollution of political communities and the souls of those who
lead them can be found in book 8 of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws and in
Machiavelli’s Discourses. 
Money often features in these accounts (as in Plato’s), but when it does, it’s the
corruption of the soul by the desire for money, which leads to all kinds of money-
motivated misconduct, not just the bribe-taking associated with the second sense
of corruption. And things other than money can also drive this kind of corrup-
tion. For example, we might describe a heroin addict as corrupted by the drug:
her character and motivational structure have been warped by the desire for the
drug; as a result, her will is no longer her own: she has become profoundly hete-
ronomous.
Importantly, there need not be anything morally blameworthy about this kind of
corruption. One’s soul might become corrupted through no fault of one’s own.
For example, we often say that a child is “spoiled” (that is, corrupted) by overly
permissive or protective parents. This kind of corruption might, on the folk psy-
chological account of the process, ruin the child’s character later in life, making
him weak, needy, dependent, demanding—but this isn’t really the child’s fault:
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it’s something someone else did to him.5 And the appropriate response to the
child or adult who has been thus corrupted (as with the heroin addict) isn’t
punishment but therapy, treatment, an organized effort to remove the corrupting
influence from his soul. 
The disloyalty sense of corruption should be, but often is not, kept distinct from
the tainting sense.6 The “corrupt cop” is disloyal, as are Hesiod’s βασιληας δωρο-
φάγος7 who issue corrupt judgments. Neither need be polluted; we’re not pri-
marily concerned with the state of their souls but with the wickedness of their
behavior. The quintessential form of disloyal corruption is government bribe-
taking: an official betrays his public duties for money. (In the next subsection I
will generalize this conception to other forms of what I will call “transactional
disloyalty,” but for now, let us assume we just mean bribe-taking.) And that
behavior need not represent anything about his character as a whole: a cop might
succumb to the temptation to take just one bribe, and otherwise be an exempla-
ry citizen in her public and private life.  
This kind of corruption is always a pro tanto wrongful act. By “pro tanto wrong-
ful,” I mean that ordinarily we will say that the bribe-taking sort of corruption
is morally blamable. There might be reasons to surrender that judgment in an
individual case—the blamability of bribe-taking corruption is defeasible—but
the burden of persuasion is on the person who wants to redeem the act. And, in
consequence, the remedy for bribe-taking corruption isn’t treatment or therapy,
it’s punishment. The corrupt cop hasn’t had the autonomy of his will overthrown
by some kind of external influence. Bribe taking is an intentional act: we ordi-
narily attribute moral responsibility to those who do it. 
Of course, the two flavors of corruption aren’t wholly independent. It’s very
plausible to think that someone’s character might be corrupted by a habit of
bribe-taking (an implication of the general Aristotelian proposition that one’s
character is primarily composed of one’s habitual behaviors); it’s also plausible
to think that someone with a twisted soul is more likely to take bribes.8 And we
might easily think that a community or organization as a whole could be warped
by a widespread practice of bribe-taking.9 But these are contingent, rather than
necessary, facts about any particular person or social arrangement. It is possible
to take just one bribe; it is also possible to be twisted in ways that don’t impli-
cate the notions of bribe-taking or disloyalty. Yet scholars routinely merge the
two ideas together; Underkuffler, to give the most recent example, gives a con-
ception of corruption as a whole as a form of tainted character that always comes
attached to moral blame and captures the intuitive core of corrupt acts like bribe-
taking.10 But this is a mistake: twistedness may be (contingently) causally relat-
ed to blameworthy acts including, but not limited to, bribe-taking, but they are
conceptually distinct and there is no necessary relationship between the two.11
In the remainder of the first half of this paper, I set aside the tainting kind of
corruption to draw out the individual version of the disloyalty kind. The object
of the exercise is to provide a base for discussing, in the second half of the paper,
how disloyalty-corruption might be transposed to the institutional context. 
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MORALIZED INDIVIDUAL CORRUPTION 
AS TRANSACTIONAL DISLOYALTY
Begin with a paradigm case of individual corruption in the bribe-taking sense.12
Alice is an income tax collector employed by her government. She learns that
Barry has lied about his income, and calls him in for an audit. Barry happens to
be the director of admissions at Yale University, and he offers to see to it that
Alice’s son is admitted to the freshman class if she buries the evidence of his tax
evasion. Alice agrees. 
Obviously, Alice’s behavior is corrupt. (So is Barry’s, but I will focus on Alice.)
She has sold the powers of her official position for personal gain. But what’s
wrong with it? 
I would like to suggest that Alice has committed a kind of theft. She’s stolen the
property of the government, in the sense that she’s taken her official powers,
which are entrusted to her for public purposes and in pursuit of the public good,
and converted them to her own use. She treats, that is, her official powers as her
own property.
To see that this is an accurate expression of our intuitions about what’s wrong
with Alice’s bribe-taking, compare her to Carol. Carol is not an employee of the
tax collection agency, she’s a tax farmer, like those in use in Ancien régime
France and many other countries on the Continent up to the 18th century.13 She
has purchased the right to collect taxes from the government, and is entitled by
the terms of that purchase to keep what she can collect. When Carol meets Barry
and agrees to forget about Barry’s tax debt in exchange for preferential univer-
sity admissions, she is, intuitively, not doing anything wrong. The power to col-
lect taxes from Barry isn’t someone else’s, it’s her personal right, which she has
purchased, fair and square, from the government. That power being her person-
al property, she’s free to trade it however she pleases in the marketplace, and if
her son’s admission to Yale is worth more to her than the amount of money that
she would otherwise receive from Barry, there are no moral or legal reasons for
her not to take the deal.14
With this intuition tentatively in place, it is now necessary to further interrogate
the idea of using someone else’s property as one’s own. What is it about Alice’s
bribe-taking that feels so much like theft? 
We can easily isolate several things that are irrelevant. First, it’s not relevant
that Alice receives a personal benefit from her bribe-taking; we can easily sub-
stitute a case where what she receives is wholly altruistic (“forget about my tax
fraud and I’ll go volunteer in this hospital for a year”)15. Second, the particular
form of currency that Alice receives isn’t relevant: she could get money, she
could get college admission for her child, she could have a building named after
her—it’s still corruption.
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Rather, what seems to be key here is the kind of relationship that Alice has with
the government, and with the official powers that the government has delegat-
ed (not granted) to her. In legal (and economic) jargon, Alice is an agent, and the
government is the principal. The defining feature of a principal-agent relation-
ship is that the principal gives the agent authority—the power to carry out
actions in the principal’s name—which is to be used for the principal.
The key idea is “for the principal”: the authority delegated to the agent is not the
agent’s to use however she or he wants. “For the principal” encompasses a wide
but not limitless scope of variation.16 Sometimes “for the principal” means
“according to the principal’s commands”—in the most basic kind of employer-
employee relationship, the duty of the employee is just to do what he’s told—
and those commands can be more or less abstract, depending on the extent to
which the principal is to use her own judgment to carry out the employer’s stat-
ed goals (“maximize the value of my stock portfolio”), or just to complete dis-
crete tasks (“pick these berries and carry them to the barn”). Other times, “for
the principal” means “in order to serve ends that we attribute to the principal”
or “in the principal’s best interests,” regardless of what the principal says she or
he wants (or when the principal is an entity that can’t give commands except
through agents, like a corporation)—for example, we can conceive of the
guardian of a child or an incompetent person as an agent of that person, delegated
the authority to conduct the principal’s affairs according to the agent’s best judg-
ment of the principal’s interests.17
Whatever “for the principal” means in a given case, it clearly doesn’t mean “for
the satisfaction of the personal preferences, interests, or whims of the agent.” In
this sense, an agent who uses her authority for her own ends, even if they’re
altruistic, does engage in a kind of stealing: she takes something rightfully owned
(in the sense that the owner of something is entitled to receive the benefits of that
thing) by another and uses it to serve ends not encompassed by the true owner.
For example, in ordinary English, it’s admissible to say that an employee who
starts an internet side-business from the office, using his employer’s equipment
and during time for which he is being paid a salary, has stolen the time and the
use of the equipment from his employer. 
So far, it looks like the principal-agent relationship is all burden for the agent and
no benefit; it even looks like I’ve said that the agent is a thief if she manages to
get any personal benefit out of the relationship. But this isn’t right: obviously,
nobody would ever willingly serve as an agent if the relationship were so one-
sided. And this is why, typically, agency relationships are established by contract,
for compensation. The principal and the agent agree on the ways in which the
agent’s preferences are to be served by the relationship, and these are the incen-
tive to get the agent to assume an obligation of loyalty to the principal. Com-
pensation comes in many forms (including, inter alia, salaries, tips from third
parties, commissions, perks like the personal use of a company car, etc.), and is
sometimes implicit, drawing on shared social customs, general legal ideas, prac-
tices in a given industry, etc.
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We now have a schematic description of the principal-agent relationship: a prin-
cipal delegates authority to an agent, where the authority is to be used for the
principal, and, in exchange for taking on the obligation to act for the principal,
the agent receives compensation, which is specified by the terms of the agree-
ment, or by shared norms governing the parties. 
That schematic allows us to see where Alice went wrong in our initial example:
she didn’t use her authority for her principal, the government. She used it for her-
self (or her son), without the (actual or attributed) agreement of the principal
per her compensation scheme. 
And that is what I mean by saying that Alice used the authority of the govern-
ment as her own. If Alice, like Carol, owned the right to receive taxation, she
would be entitled to use it to serve her own preferences, whatever those prefer-
ences might be (absent some other principle barring it). The extent to which
Carol is allowed to serve her own preferences with the power to collect taxes
isn’t specified by some preexisting compensation agreement, but is important-
ly open-ended, and that’s what it means to have some power for one’s own: one
has an open-ended entitlement to use it in whatever way one wants. So, the dis-
tinction between Alice and Carol is that Alice has a power which is only to be
used either to serve the government, or to obtain compensation that the govern-
ment’s agreed to; Carol has a general-use power. 
The conversion of a principal’s power—the use of one’s principal’s property or
authority as one’s own—appears to be a necessary condition for classifying some
act as corrupt in the disloyalty sense. We can test this against the most classic
cases of corruption. A football player who takes a kickback from a gambler to
throw the game counts as corrupt because she’s converting the authority of her
license to participate on the team, which was delegated to her so that she may
pursue the team’s interest in winning. Similarly, a legislator who sells his vote
is corrupt, because he uses the authority delegated to him by the demos, but not
for the demos. On the other hand, a politician who changes his legislative vote
in order to win electoral votes is not corrupt, because an implicit condition of the
agency agreement between the legislator and the demos is that the legislator is
allowed to use his vote to win the support of constituents, and hence get com-
pensation in the form of the status and salary of the office—it’s a use of author-
ity contemplated by the relationship. 
However, such conversion can’t be a sufficient condition. There are many cases
of agents converting their authority that we would not describe as corruption. For
example, the delivery person who takes the company vehicle to go drag racing
clearly is converting his authorization to use his employer’s property, but isn’t
engaging in corruption. The same goes for the police officer who abuses her
public powers by harassing her personal enemies. Both of those wrongdoers are
offending against morality as well as (in every state of which I’m aware) law, but
they’re not engaging in corruption. In our ordinary use of the term, to mere
malfeasance of office, bribe-taking as the quintessential case of corruption adds
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a relational element: the corrupt agent exchanges his relationship with his prin-
cipal for a relationship with someone else. And the way in which the corrupt
agent uses the property of his principal as his own is transactional: she makes
use of the principal’s authority to conduct a personal transaction with some third
party, a transaction for himself or for someone else rather than for the principal;
in doing so, his loyalty to his principal is undermined and at least partially trans-
ferred to that other person.
This final idea gives us individual corruption as disloyalty: a property of the
actions of agents, such that an agent’s action is disloyalty-corrupt when 1) she
treats the authority delegated to her by her principal as her own, by using that
authority other than for the principal or in pursuit of the agent’s compensation
as ordinarily understood by the principal and agent to be built into the relation-
ship, and 2) does so as part of a transaction with some third party in which she
betrays her loyalty to the principal.18 This kind of corruption is pro tanto moral-
ly wrong, because we value loyalty and suppose that it is a virtue, but any spe-
cific act of corruption may be more or less wrong, depending on the moral value
of the agency relationship that has been betrayed: a public official who violates
the trust of a legitimate democracy or a doctor who takes bribes to neglect her
patients is extremely blameworthy; a mafia hit man who becomes a snitch for
money may not be blameworthy at all.  
Of course, this isn’t terribly novel material. Scholars have been debating what
exactly corruption is for decades. Fortunately for me, Laura Underkuffler has
written a book comprehensively reviewing the major streams of argument and
criticizing them.19 I will take a moment to discuss how this conception avoids her
main lines of criticism.  
Against conceptions of corruption that build the moral idea of corruption out of
the violation of legal entitlements, Underkuffler points out that we can have vio-
lations of legal entitlements that are not wrongful, if the law itself is morally
objectionable.20 Even though my account of corruption draws on legal concepts,
and depends on the violation of some entitlement (of the principal, to having the
authority she delegates used for her), it is not subject to this objection, because
nothing in my account requires that the entitlements be legal entitlements. We
can conceive of a legal kind of corruption, in which an agent uses the principal’s
authority as her own, and we say that the authority in question is “the principal’s”
because the law designates it as such. Such law-corruption is pro tanto wrong-
ful to the extent legal entitlements track forms of loyalty that we have reason to
value, such as promise-keeping, loyalty to employers or governments, etc. Alter-
natively, we can conceive of a moral kind of corruption, in which an agent uses
the principal’s authority as her own, and we say that the authority is rightfully
the principal’s because the principal has a moral entitlement to it. Such moral
corruption may or may not be against the law.21 On the conception articulated in
this paper, disloyalty-corruption is a form of transaction and relationship that
can be discovered in the moral domain or the legal.22
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Moreover, while Underkuffler is right to argue that the concept of (disloyalty-)
corruption inherently implies moral condemnation, she misses that this con-
demnation is merely pro tanto: the corruption of an act always gives some rea-
son not to do that act, but the reason can be outweighed by other moral reasons
in appropriate situations.23 To see the defeasibility of the moral condemnation of
disloyalty-corruption, consider an extreme example. Suppose a Nazi official
takes a bribe from a Jewish family to free them from a death camp. The act is
corrupt. It has to be. Bribe-taking by a public official is the central case of cor-
ruption; if anything is corrupt, that is. But being corrupt doesn’t make it evil.
Because Nazi Germany can’t generate legitimate claims to its officials’ loyalty,
and because of the overriding moral importance of not participating in geno-
cide, the bribed Nazi’s corruption is positively laudable. The pro tanto wrong-
ness of corruption has been totally overridden.
Yet, Underkuffler might object, that example actually seems to suggest that I’m
wrong to say that disloyalty corruption is only pro tanto blamable. After all,
intuitively, surely the official who only releases Jews when bribed does some-
thing wrong. To answer this point, I submit that even if one shares that intuition,
we can explain it from corruption-independent moral principles, such that it does
not require the conclusion that corruption is more than pro tanto blamable. 
Consider an alternate case: the whimsical Nazi. The whimsical Nazi frees Jews
for wholly arbitrary reasons, say, by rolling dice. The whimsical Nazi isn’t cor-
rupt on my definition (there’s no transactional element), and doesn’t look like a
bribe-taker. Yet we should still have a strong intuition that the whimsical Nazi
is doing wrong, and we can explain it from all the major moral perspectives and
see that it is the same intuition that applies to the bribed Nazi. For a utilitarian,
it’s not wrong for the whimsical Nazi to free the lucky Jews or the bribed Nazi
to free Jews who pay; the real wrong is the failure to free the unlucky or non-
bribing Jews. For a Kantian, the bribed and whimsical Nazis free the Jews for
the wrong reasons: they’re supposed to free them from a recognition that it’s
morally wrong to murder them, not from pecuniary or random motives. Simi-
larly, for a Humean or virtue ethicist, the bribed and whimsical Nazis are sup-
posed to free the Jews out of a sympathy for the wrong done them, not out of
avarice or caprice. None of these general moral critiques of the bribed and whim-
sical Nazis have anything to do with corruption, and do nothing to undermine the
proposition that the bribed Nazis corruption, standing alone, is virtuous. 
We now have the analytic tools in hand to put the tainting/disloyalty typology
to work in understanding institutional corruption.
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION: EXTENDING THE TYPOLOGY
In recent years, there has been growing interest in a notion of “institutional cor-
ruption,” a kind of corruption that is a property not of individuals but of politi-
cal, economic, or social organizations. A legislature like the U.S. Congress, for
example, might be said to be institutionally corrupt in virtue of the relationship
between campaign finance and the ability to get elected, and this might be true
independent of whether we can say that any individual member of or candidate
for Congress is corrupt. 
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The best discussions of institutional corruption, however, appear to be solely of
the tainting sort. As yet, I have been unable to find a plausible version of insti-
tutional corruption equivalent to the disloyalty conception which I’ve described
for the individual case. In the remainder of this paper, I will first discuss the
leading account of institutional corruption as tainting, Lessig’s “improper
dependence” conception, and then give an account of institutional corruption as
disloyalty. I will then criticize Dennis Thompson’s version of institutional cor-
ruption, which appears to draw from ideas of disloyalty, but does not do so con-
vincingly. Finally, I’ll describe the moral significance of disloyalty-corruption in
the institutional domain.
NON-MORALIZED INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION: 
THE DEPENDENCE CONCEPTION
Lessig has, over the last several years, been advancing a “dependence concep-
tion” of institutional corruption. For Lessig, an institution is corrupt when it or
its members have become dependent on the wrong thing. Congress has become
dependent on funders, rather than on the people, therefore, Congress is corrupt.24
Elsewhere, Lessig defined institutional corruption as follows: 
a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently eth-
ical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from
its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including,
to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust
in that institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.25
I take these two definitions to be cover essentially similar territory: the “sys-
tematic and strategic influence” of the second is the improper dependence of the
first, and the purpose of the second is the proper dependence, the one that an
institution ought to have, of the first. 
Lessig’s conception is clearly equivalent to what in the individual domain I have
called tainting-corruption. The idea of dependence is closely intertwined with
that of tainting: pollutants corrupt the motivational structure of an individual as
well as of an institution by generating dependence. Thus, the heroin addict exam-
ple is tainting-corrupt in virtue of her dependence on heroin; it is the dependence
that warps her character, and that subverts her will—it is that which makes her
heteronomous. Similarly, Tsarina Alexandra was corrupted when she became
dependent on Rasputin as a political, religious, and personal adviser, rather than
on her own judgment or the advice of her non-evil advisers. The vain have
become corrupted because they are addicted to the praise and admiration of oth-
ers. And so forth.
Appropriately for a tainting conception, Lessig’s conception of institutional cor-
ruption depends on a preexisting story about what an uncorrupted institution
would look like, in the form of the requirement that the institution’s effective-
ness (i.e., its actual purpose, the content of its true collective will unaffected by
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the external, heteronomy-producing influence, its proper dependence) actually
is undermined. Moreover, Lessig’s conception seems to do a very good job at
explaining our intuitions for concrete cases: the role of campaign finance in a
legislature, or the role of gift-giving in pharmaceutical marketing, two of the
main cases of institutional corruption on Lessig’s account, do seem to have this
sense of pollution: these practices are an insidious influence that taint the essence
of the institutions in question.26
To see that the dependency corruption is not a moralized conception, and does
not depend on disloyalty, consider that an institution can be dependency corrupt
where individual agents are not doing anything even pro tanto wrong. Lessig
gives as an example of institutional corruption the improper dependency of a
judicial system on judicial ideologies,27 but this dependency can exist without
any individual judge doing anything morally suspect. Accordingly, we might
think, in accordance with the suggestion made at the beginning of this paper in
the individual context, that the appropriate social response to dependence cor-
ruption is something like treatment: the corrupting influence of campaign
finance, or judicial ideology, or pharmaceutical research support, ought to be
purged from the system; being purged, the institution can go on, with no moral
critique addressed to either people or organizations. 
MORALIZED INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 
However, there is conceptual space for a form of institutional corruption in the
moralized, disloyalty, sense. Here, I describe one.
Elsewhere, I have shown that the rule of law is a property of a state’s legal sys-
tems, and one of its requirements is regularity: a state that comports with regu-
larity is one in which officials use their power only under the constraint of
reasonably specific legal rules.28 In a regular state, officials maintain a role sep-
aration between their institutional roles and their personal identities: they set
down their official powers when they leave the job; when they’re on the job,
they exercise their powers as given by law, for the ends encompassed by the law,
when they clock out, they’re free to use their personal resources to pursue their
personal ends.29 Perhaps the exemplar of the official under the rule of law is the
Anglo-American judge, whose institutional role is most strictly separate from her
personal identity, a separation enforced not only by legal and ethical demands
such as recusal requirements, but even by ritual: a judge puts on her role, and her
impartiality, with a robe (and, traditionally in some countries, a wig), a symbol-
ic reaffirmation and reminder of the difference between the judge’s ordinary life
and her life within the law.
By contrast, when regularity fails, this role separation does not obtain. Officials
no longer are constrained to treat their powers as a trust to be used in accordance
with the law. Instead, the institutions of the state permit officials to use their
powers as part of their personal endowments (either by not making this use ille-
gal, or not enforcing or being able to enforce such laws as exist), to be used 
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however they want. Judges are allowed to rule for their friends, police officers
are allowed to harass their enemies. That is, officials are allowed to treat their
powers, delegated to them by the state and for the state’s purposes, as their own
personal property, for their own purposes.
It now becomes clear that individual disloyalty corruption and failures of regu-
larity have the same basic feature of conversion of authority. And this gives us
a candidate definition of institutional disloyalty corruption in a state: institu-
tional corruption in a state is one way in which regularity can fail, characterized
by officials being permitted by the de jure or de facto norms of the state to use
their power as their own personal property in transactions with others. Institu-
tional corruption is just a failure of the rule of law in transactional form. 
The contrast between institutional and individual disloyalty corruption, then, is
one of norms. Individual corruption violates some kind of meaningful legal,
social, or economic (contractual) norm: an individually corrupt agent is one who
not only converts his authority and switches his loyalties from his principal to
someone else, but who violates the expectations embedded into his agency rela-
tionship by doing so. By contrast, in a case of institutional corruption, the agency
relationship—typically with the state, although I will consider below cases of non-
state institutional corruption—itself is defective, such that agents are permitted by
the norms that govern it to convert their powers and switch their loyalties.
On this definition, there are two quintessential cases of institutional disloyalty-
corruption. The first is a state where the laws make no attempt to control the
transactional conversion of public power, such as a dictatorship in which offi-
cials are permitted to use their powers to extract money and favors from the pop-
ulace. The second is a state that formally defines the duties of its officials, but
where, in reality, the laws are so ineffective at controlling them that officials
routinely sell their powers for a price; this sale has become the new norm with-
in the state. 
Here, however, a problem with this understanding begins to appear. The notion
of a conversion of authority presupposes some preexisting standard to determine
for whom the authority in question is to be used (that is, who is the principal),
and what constitutes using that authority for the principal. In the case of indi-
vidual corruption, that standard can be supplied by preexisting legal, social, or
economic/contractual norms. But institutional disloyalty-corruption is defined in
part by the absence of effective norms. To understand institutional disloyalty-cor-
ruption, we must have the concept of an agent who is allowed to use her power
in a way that is nonetheless unauthorized. 
Allowedness can be a purely positive notion: to say that A is allowed to X might
just mean that nothing is stopping A from X. For example, we can say that Gen-
eral McClellan allowed the Southern army to escape after the Battle of Anti-
etam; by this we would merely mean that McClellan failed to stop the Southern
army from escaping, even though he could have done so. By contrast, authori-
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zation is most naturally a normative notion. To say that A is authorized to X car-
ries with it the implication that there is some evaluative standard (which need not
be all-things-considered morality) according to which it is right that A X. Thus,
it makes sense for ordinary users of English to say that the Southern army was
allowed, but not authorized, to escape. The difference depends on the existence
of an evaluative standard (norm).
Where there are existing de jure norms regulating the use of official power, but
those norms are toothless and ignored, the norm against which we judge official
power to be converted without authorization can be internal, drawn from the
ambitions that the law declares, but fails to meet. We might also draw such inter-
nal norms from the non-legal ambitions of a political community. For example,
if there are documents, historical declarations, or cultural or religious ideals that
express the guiding purposes of a political community, as for example the U.S.
Declaration of Independence and preamble to the Constitution, we might say
that a set of operational social or legal norms that allow officials to use their
power inconsistent with those ideals is institutionally corrupt. However, where
no such internal norms are available, we must appeal to external norms, such as
moral principles or general ideas about what government power is for and how
it ought to work. In such cases, the idea of institutional corruption as disloyalty
may have no independent normative content: it may simply refer to a norm of
behavior that violates independent moral principles governing the way an enti-
ty ought to regulate its agents. When the state is involved, often this independ-
ent principle will be the rule of law, which is the moral norm governing the way
that states ought to control their officials.30 A state that gives officials too much
discretion violates the principle of regularity, in doing so, it may also allow offi-
cials treat the power delegated to them as their own, in which case it will be
institutionally corrupt in the external sense.31
Fully defined, then, institutional disloyalty-corruption is a species of norm-con-
flict. A property of systems of norms, it occurs when agents are allowed by exist-
ing de jure or de facto norms to treat the authority delegated to them by their
principals as their own, by using that authority other than for the principal or in
pursuit of the agent’s compensation (as in individual disloyalty-corruption), and
as part of loyalty-shifting transactions (as in individual disloyalty-corruption),
where those norms conflict with other moral, legal, social, or economic-con-
tractual norms applying to the principal-agent relationship that indicate that the
use to which the agent is putting her authority is not for her principal.
AN ALTERNATIVE MORALIZED CONCEPTION?
Contrast the loyalty conception given with that of Thompson. Thompson argues
that the difference between institutional and individual corruption is that in the
former, “the benefit an official receives is political rather than formal, the serv-
ice the official provides is systematic rather than episodic, and the connection
between the benefit and the service manifests a tendency that disregards the
democratic purpose,” concluding that “institutional corruption occurs when an
institution or its agent receives a benefit that is directly useful to performing an
institutional function, and systematically provides a service to the benefactor
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under conditions that tend to undermine legitimate procedures of the institu-
tion.”32 The transactional element seems to suggest that Thompson is aiming at
something like a disloyalty conception. 
However, taken as a disloyalty conception, Thompson’s definition of institu-
tional corruption seems too broad. Consider the practice of legislators making
use of briefing papers prepared by lobbyists. Under some circumstances, this
would meet Thompson’s definition: legislators receive a benefit (information)
directly useful to performing their legislative functions, they systematically pro-
vide a service to the lobbyists in the form of an audience for their views as pre-
sented in those briefing papers, and, to the extent lobbyist-provided information
drowns out other information, the practice appears to undermine legitimate pro-
cedures of a legislature by undermining the extent to which constituents have
access to their representatives on equal terms, as well as undermining legislators’
access to objective and unbiased information.
Doubtless there are things to be said against the briefing paper system. By dis-
torting the information legislators receive, it may bring about worse public poli-
cies; by making it easier for special interests to be heard than ordinary citizens,
it may make the system less democratic. Yet it seems strained to describe these
vices as “corruption.” The intuitive judgment that briefing papers aren’t corrupt
proceeds, I submit, from the fact that the state retains legislators’ undivided loy-
alties: the “benefit” received by a legislator is the ability to do her job more effi-
ciently, she accepts this benefit in order to achieve that end, and there’s no reason
to think that the provision of briefing papers in any way obligates legislators to
provide special advantages to lobbyists. The special advantages lobbyists hap-
pen to receive from legislators as a result of their providing briefing papers are
just the incidental consequences of their having made themselves useful to the
government in a personally beneficial way, not the object of some kind of quid
pro quo. 
Moreover, Thompson’s definition requires bad consequences (“tends to under-
mine the legitimate purposes”). But our ordinary notions of disloyalty-corrup-
tion depend on the character of the act, not on its consequences. We would
ordinarily say, for example, that an institutionalized system of bribery that citi-
zens and officials use to evade an ossified and inefficient bureaucracy is a form
of corruption, even though it brings about good consequences. It’s not clear that
Thompson’s account has the resources to explain that judgment. 
My definition avoids these problems. It accounts for the non-corruption of the
briefing paper system, because it requires transactions and shifting loyalties.
And it depends only on the character of an act, rather than its consequences33.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE MORAL CRISIS OF CORRUPTION
Let us return for a moment to the case of the U.S. Congress. Lessig has given us
a compelling account of how it is corrupt in the non-moralized sense, and thus
a suitable candidate for treatment—for the removal of the polluting influence of
money. But we can also give a case for Congress being corrupt in the moral-
ized, disloyalty, sense, and thus a suitable candidate for moral condemnation.
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Regularity is not the only principle of the rule of law. Another is generality,
which requires that the positive law apply to all citizens on equal terms, or, more
precisely, treat all citizens as equals.34 While the principle of generality applies
to all states, it has particular importance in democracies, which come prepack-
aged with the notion that each citizen is to be equal under law. Thicker theories
of democracy, such as Rousseau’s, have the notion of general law built right in,
in the form of the claim that the general will cannot speak except through gen-
eral laws—that is, that a mode of government that depends on the notion that
each law is the will of all citizens must necessarily presuppose that each law is
justifiable by reasons that include each citizen.35
The principle of generality can give the external normative standard against
which we can see institutional disloyalty-corruption in a democracy. A legisla-
tor who is individually disloyalty-corrupt betrays the public by making law that
is not general—that fails to treat citizens as equals, that cannot be defended in
terms of reasons that are applicable to the population as a whole—in the context
of corrupting transactions. And a state that permits such lawmaking is institu-
tionally disloyalty-corrupt. 
The difference between the applications of the dependency conception of cor-
ruption and disloyalty-corruption is that disloyalty-corruption requires the laws
actually be bought: legislators must actually make deals leading to non-general
laws; the mere influence of campaign finance on elections is insufficient. For
example, suppose we lived in a (bizarre) state in which the wealthy cared about
exactly one political issue: how physically attractive their representatives hap-
pened to be. In this world, they would donate lots of money to the beautiful
politicians and none to the ugly; only the beautiful would win what Lessig has
called the “funders election” and have a chance to go before the people. Assum-
ing that the beautiful aren’t systematically different from ordinary people, such
a world would be characterized by an improper dependency, just as ours, but
that dependency would have no political effect: politicians would feel no need
to do anything special in order to appeal to the funders, their political positions
would not change as a result of the funders election, and their loyalty would
continue to lie entirely with the people. In such a world, Congress would count
as corrupt under the dependency conception of institutional corruption but not
the disloyalty conception.
Importantly, such a state could still count as a Rousseauian democracy, since
the laws could still be aimed at the public good. For the same reason, such a
state could still comport with the rule of law. By contrast, in a state in which
Congress actually makes non-general laws as a result of being bought, the laws
are no longer general, and it is no longer a Rousseauian democracy. Bought leg-
islators are no longer loyal to the people: those whose interests are disregarded
(and there must be some in order for us to say that law is not general) are no
longer treated as part of the polis to which the bought legislator is accountable.36
Similarly, a state in which judges and police are bought fails by the standards of
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democracy in addition to the rule of law: being unconstrained by law, the bribed
officials no longer serve the sovereign demos, which no longer controls the
power exercised by its officials.37
It is for that reason that a disloyalty-corrupt state warrants moral condemnation
as well as reform.38 A state that is institutionally corrupt in the dependency sense
is merely broken. It is likely to function sub-optimally; we probably won’t get
politicians as good or legislation as wise as we might get otherwise. Such cor-
ruption calls for reform. A state that is institutionally corrupt in the disloyalty
sense is illegitimate. Failing by the standards of both democracy and the rule of
law, such a state presents the public with an urgent moral crisis. 
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NOTES
1 I thank Zephyr Teachout and Joseph Yockey for taking the time to read an earlier draft of this
paper. 
2 From On the Crown, Vince trans.
3 Nagle, John, “Corruption, Pollution, and Politics,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 110, no. 2, 2000,
p. 293, insightfully draws out the analogy between corruption and pollution for the case of
money in politics.
4 For example, Kleinig, John and William Heffernan, “The Corruptibility of Corruption,” in
Heffernan and Kleinig, (eds.), Private and Public Corruption, Lanham, MD, Rowman &
Littlefield, 2004, p. 3-24, argue that the disloyalty sense is a modern derivative of the ancient
pollution sense. 
5 For a case where the one who is corrupted is even more clearly blameless, a slave can be cor-
rupted by the condition he finds himself in, trained to a habit of subservience (“servility”—
Satz, Debra, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 184-6). Compare Euben, J. Peter, “On Political Corrup-
tion,” The Antioch Review, vol. 36, no. 1, 1978, p. 103, who points out in his insightful elu-
cidation of tainting-corruption that powerlessness corrupts just as surely as does Lord Acton’s
power.
6 For example, Carl J. Friedrich, “Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective,” in Arnold
Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston & Victor LeVine (eds.), Political Corruption: A Handbook,
Piscataway, New Jersey, Transaction, 1989, p. 15-23, gives an excellent history of the taint-
ing conception, but inappropriately assimilates it to bribe-taking both in a discussion of Plato
and in discussing its modern application.
7 Most evocatively translated by Hugh G. Evelyn-White as “bribe-swallowing lords.”
8 For example, Blau, Adrian, “Hobbes on Corruption,” History of Political Thought vol. 30,
no. 4, 2009, p. 596, interestingly suggests that, for Hobbes, bribe-taking follows from a “cog-
nitive corruption” where one’s mental process is corrupted and one misapprehends one’s
self-interest.
9 Underkuffler, Laura, Captured by Evil: The Idea of Corruption in Law, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 2013 draws on this idea to point out the dangers of corruption for a com-
munity’s legal order as a whole.
10 Ibid.
11 I take Underkuffler’s work to be primarily sociological: she admirably draws out the con-
ception of corruption at work in our legal system and public political culture, a conception
that does seem to equivocate between the tainting and disloyalty notions. By contrast, my task
here is more akin to conceptual analysis in analytic philosophy, attempting to sort out our uses
of the concept of corruption in internally consistent and defensible ways. Consequently, noth-
ing here should be taken as an objection to Underkuffler’s sociological analysis.
12 I attempt, here, to draw out our concept of corruption using something like what Finnis,
John, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 9-10, calls the
“central cases” method, beginning from bribery and generalizing out.
13 On the institution in general, see White, Eugene “From Privatized to Government-Admin-
istered Tax Collection: Tax Farming in Eighteenth-Century France,” The Economic History
Review, vol. 57, 2004, p. 636-663.
14 Actually, this isn’t quite right, because she may have moral or legal reason to not participate
in Barry’s corrupt conversion of his official Yale powers, but let us assume this away for
purposes of analytic clarity.
15 And Alice would still count as corrupt even if we are consequentialists who think that, on the
whole, Barry’s year at the hospital will produce more good than Alice’s faithfully collecting
the state’s taxes; similarly, Robin Hood was still a thief, even if his theft might arguably have
been justifiable by some external moral principle. 
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16 In all cases, however, for an agent to use the authority delegated to her “for X” is to intend
the appropriate relationship between the act of using authority and X’s instructions or inter-
ests; if A’s use of authority happens to incidentally serve X’s interests or instructions even
though she intends to use it in pursuit of someone else’s (Y’s) interests or instructions, A
uses the authority for Y, not for X.
17 In legal jargon, we usually say that guardians are “fiduciaries,” but a fiduciary is basically
just an agent for a particularly vulnerable principal upon whom the law imposes extra-strict
obligations.
18 The closest view to mine in the prior literature of which I’m aware is Zimring, Franklin and
David Johnson, “On The Comparative Study of Corruption,”Pacific McGeorge Global Busi-
ness & Development Law Journal, vol. 20, 2007, p. 243, who also define corruption in terms
of the abuse of authority, but who leave off the transactional element. Zimring and John-
son’s definition of corruption also requires it be illegal; as will be discussed later in this
paper, this need not be a property of all kinds of corruption on my account.
19 Underkuffler, “Captured by Evil,” op. cit..
20 Ibid., p. 11-14.
21 This is similar to the conception of corruption held by the framers of the U.S. Constitution,
according to Teachout, Zephyr, “The Anti-Corruption Principle,” Cornell Law Review, vol.
20, 2009, p. 373-377.
22 Ordinarily, disloyalty-corruption will be both illegal and all-things-considered immoral, but
that’s because people ordinarily ought to keep their promises, and because states ordinarily
find it expedient to outlaw things like bribe-taking; these are both contingent rather than nec-
essary facts about any particular instance of corruption.
23 Underkuffler, “Captured by Evil,” op. cit. p. 21-22, levies a similar objection against con-
ceptions of corruption that center on the betrayal of trust; this version of the objection is
answered in the same way.
24 Lessig, Lawrence, “What an Originalist Would Understand ‘Corruption’ to Mean”, Califor-
nia Law Review, forthcoming.
25 Lessig, Lawrence, “‘Institutional Corruption’ Defined,” Journal of Law, Medicine, and
Ethics, vol. 41, no. 3, 2013, p. 2. 
26 However, dependence may not be the only way an institution can be tainting-corrupt. For
example, we might think that the private prison industry corrupts the criminal justice system
by, inter alia, inserting minimum occupancy requirements into contracts with states and lob-
bying for harsh criminal laws, even though the system is in no sense “dependent” on that
industry.
27 Lessig, “‘Institutional Corruption’ Defined,” op. cit., p. 3.
28 Gowder, Paul, “The Rule of Law and Equality,” Law and Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 5, 2013,
p. 565.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 To see that this is about discretion rather than about financial transactions themselves, imag-
ine a state in which police officers are explicitly allowed to take personal payments in lieu
of ticketing minor traffic violations. Those police officers would resemble the tax farmers of
Ancien régime in France: they would not be entitled to use their power for themselves rather
than for the state, but would simply be entitled to count as their compensation some payments
directly from those over whom they wield the state’s power, in clearly defined circumstances.
(And this would most likely be written into law in order to serve the state’s purposes, since hav-
ing fines paid directly to individual police officers would still deter traffic violations, while
saving administrative and salary costs.) This would be an example neither of the failure of reg-
ularity (officials still being adequately constrained, i.e., not permitted to solicit payments except
in the narrow situations specified by law), nor of institutional disloyalty corruption.
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32 Thompson, Dennis, “Two Concepts of Corruption,” Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, no.
16, 2013, p. 8-9.
33 Leff, Nathaniel, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption,” American
Behavioral Scientist, vol. 8, no. 3, 1964, p. 8, is the classic account of such allegedly good
corruption.
34 Gowder, Paul, “Equal Law in an Unequal World,” Iowa Law Review, vol.99, no. 3, 2014, 
p. 1021.
35 Cohen, Joshua, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” in Seyla Benhabib
(ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 95-119, explains that making laws that are not justifi-
able to each citizen by public reasons amounts to excluding them; Gowder, “Equal Law in
an Unequal World” explains the application of public reason to the rule of law principle of
generality. See also Warren, Mark, “What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?,” Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science, vol. 48 no. 2, 2004, p. 328, who elucidates a notion of
democratic corruption as exclusion.
36 Such a state will be corrupt in both the dependency and the disloyalty senses: the (purchased)
devotion of politicians to the private interest rather than the public interest and the general
will will taint the body politic. This, according to Saxonhouse, was the ultimate sense of
political corruption captured by Plato and Aristotle. We might also understand this conjunc-
tion of dependency and disloyalty through Rousseau and Kant: the polis has become het-
eronomous in Kant’s sense; it no longer is self-ruling, and hence is also no longer free in
Rousseau’s sense. 
37 In other work, in progress, I argue that for this reason that the rule of law is necessary for pop-
ular sovereignty.
38 To the extent there are normative principles that apply to institutions other than the state,
but which perform functions similar to those that the rule of law and democracy perform for
states, we can apply the concept of institutional disloyalty-corruption in a similar way. Med-
icine is an obvious example: if the de facto norms of a given medical industry allow doctors
to abandon their patients’ interests to pursue pharmaceutical industry bribes, that industry is
disloyalty-corrupt by the lights of the evaluative standards that apply to the medical profes-
sion, and loses its entitlement to the status, esteem, and deference we ordinarily accord it. On
the other hand, a medical industry might merely be dependence (tainting-) corrupt, if, e.g.,
it’s polluted by bad science, not disloyalty.
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